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Abstract
The theory of belief revision and merging has recently been applied to judgement aggregation. In this article I argue that
judgements are best aggregated by merging the evidence on which they are based, rather than by directly merging the
judgements themselves. This leads to a three-step strategy for judgement aggregation. First, merge the evidence bases of the
various agents using some method of belief merging. Second, determine which degrees of belief one should adopt on the basis
of this merged evidence base, by applying objective Bayesian theory. Third, determine which judgements are appropriate
given these degrees of belief by applying a decision-theoretic account of rational judgement formation.
Keywords:Judgementaggregation,beliefmerging,beliefrevision,objectiveBayesianism,decisiontheory,maximumentropy
1 Introduction
In recent years formal methods originally developed by computer scientists and logicians to deal
with inconsistencies in databases have been increasingly applied to problems in social epistemology.
Thus, the formal theory of belief revision and merging, developed since the 1980s to help maintain
consistency when revising and merging sets of propositions, has been applied by Meyer et al.[ 18]
and Choi [3] to the problem of aggregating preferences, applied by Gauwin et al.[ 7] to the problem
of judgement deliberation and conciliation, and applied by Pigozzi [22] to the problem of judgement
aggregation.
It is this latter application, to judgement aggregation, that is the focus of this article. In Section 2,
I shall introduce the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difﬁculties encountered in
trying to solve this problem. Section 3 will introduce the theory of belief revision and merging and
Pigozzi’s application of this theory to judgement aggregation. I argue, in Section 4, that judgements
should not be merged directly; rather, one should merge the evidence on which the judgements are
based.Giventhismergedepistemicbackground,probabilitytheoryanddecisiontheorycanbeusedto
deriveanappropriatesetofjudgements—theresultingjudgementsshouldbeviewedastheaggregate
of the judgements of the original individuals (Section 5).
2 Judgement aggregation
In many cases it is important for a collection of agents with their own individual judgements to come
to some agreed set of judgements as a group. The question of how best to do this is the problem
of judgement aggregation. (In discussions of judgement aggregation it is normally assumed that a
judgement is a proposition or sentence and that by providing a judgement one endorses the relevant
proposition.)
Simple majority voting on each of the propositions in an agenda is unsatisfactory as a judgement
aggregation procedure for the following reason: while each individual may have a consistent set of
judgements, the aggregated set of judgements may be inconsistent. This is known as the discursive
dilemma or the doctrinal paradox [13]. Table 1 displays a simple example, taken from Dietrich and
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Table 1. An example of the discursive
dilemma
pp →qq
A true true true
B true false false
C false true false
Majority true true false
List [6]. Here three individuals have consistent sets of judgements (e.g. A judges that p,p→q and q),
but majority voting yields an inconsistent set {p,p→q,¬q} of aggregated judgements.
Problemswithmajorityvotinghaveledtoaquesttoﬁndabetterjudgementaggregationprocedure.
However, a number of impossibility theorems limit the options available—see, e.g. List and Pettit
[16, 17]; Dietrich and List [6]; Pauly and van Hees [21]. In particular Dietrich and List [6] show that
if the agenda is sufﬁciently rich and if (formalizations of) the following conditions hold, then the
onlyaggregationfunctionsaredictatorships,i.e.thosethatsimplytakethejudgementsofaparticular
individual as the judgements of the group:
Universal Domain: the domain of the aggregation function is the set of all possible proﬁles of
consistent and complete individual judgement sets,
Collective Rationality: the aggregation function generates consistent and complete collective
judgement sets,
Independence: the aggregated judgement on each proposition depends only on individual
judgements on that proposition,
Unanimity: if each individual judges a particular proposition true then so will the aggregate.
(As Dietrich and List [6] show, this result generalises Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem
concerning preference aggregation in social choice theory.)
The question thus arises as to whether any reasonable aggregation function remains. Dictatorship
aside, is there any reasonable judgement aggregation rule? If so, which of the above conditions
does it violate? We shall see next that Pigozzi [22] advocates a judgement aggregation rule that
violates Independence. I will argue in Section 5 that judgement aggregation requires a rule that may
violate all of these conditions. This rule will appeal to a richer epistemology than that invoked by
the standard examples of the judgement aggregation literature; in particular it will distinguish an
agent’s judgements and the evidence on which those judgements are based. I shall argue that only
by considering such evidence can one aggregate judgements properly. Thus problems like that of
Table 1 turn out to be underspeciﬁed.
3 Belief revision and merging
The question of how to revise and merge sets of propositions is addressed by the theory of belief
revision and merging. Belief revision seeks to say how one should revise a deductively closed set of
sentencesT inthelightofnewinformation,aconsistentsentenceθ.Thetheoryimposesthefollowing
desiderata for a belief revision operator   (known as theAGM postulates, afterAlchourrón et al.[ 1]):
 0: T  θ is consistent,
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 2: θ ∈T  θ,
 3: if T +θ, the deductive closure of T∪θ, is consistent, then T  θ=T +θ,
 4: if θ and ϕ are logically equivalent then T  θ=T  ϕ,
 5: if T  θ+ϕ is consistent then T  θ+ϕ=T  θ∧ϕ.
Alchourrón et al.[ 1] also put forward postulates for a belief contraction operator −, where T−θ
is the result of taking θ away from deductively closed T. Revision and contraction turn out to be
related by the Levi identity T  θ=(T −θ)+θ and by the Harper identity T −θ =(T  θ)∩T (for θ
not a tautology). The theory has been further extended to give an account of belief update: while for
belief revision θ and T are understood as referring to the same situation, for belief update T is taken
to refer to the past and θ to the present. See Katsuno and Mendelzon [10]; del Val and Shoham [4].
Athirdextensionofthetheoryisofspecialinteresthere.Beliefmergingseekstoprovideanaccount
of how one should combine sets T1,...,TnT of sentences. Konieczny and Pino Pérez [11] put forward
the following postulates for a merging operator   acting on a multiset T ={T1,...,TnT}, where each
Ti isassumedconsistent,thenotationTi maybeusedtorefertothesetofsentencesortheconjunction
of its members, and where T U is the multiset {T1,...,TnT,U1,...,UnU}:
 0:  T is consistent,
 1: if

T is consistent then  T =

T,
 2: if Ti and Ui are logically equivalent for i=1,...,nT =nU, then  T and  U are logically
equivalent,
 3: if

T∧

U is inconsistent then  (T U) does not logically imply T,
 4:  T∧ U logically implies  (T U),
 5: if  T∧ U is consistent then  (T U) logically implies  T∧ U.
Konieczny and Pino Pérez [12] generalize this framework to provide postulates for a merging
operator  ι with integrity constraints ι that the merged set has to satisfy. Belief merging is related
to belief revision by the identity T  ι= ι{T}, where T is a set of sentences and where merging is
subject to a deductive closure condition ([15], Section 5; [12], Section 5).
Pigozzi [22] applies belief merging to the problem of judgement aggregation. The idea is this: if n
agents have propositional judgements T ={T1,...,Tn}, then one should take  ιT as the aggregate
of these judgements, where  ι is a particular belief merging operator motivated by majority voting
considerations. In the example of the discursive dilemma of Table 1, no integrity constraints ι are
required, since postulate  0 ensures that the aggregate set is consistent. Pigozzi [22] shows that a
judicious choice of integrity constraints avoids any paradoxical outcome in another example of the
discursive dilemma. However, in all such cases the aggregation procedure results in several equally
optimal merged sets—the selection of one of these sets as the aggregate is hence rather arbitrary.
Arbitrariness is a fundamental problem when using belief merging techniques to directly aggregate
judgement sets, since there is rarely enough information in the judgement sets themselves to allow
one to decide which way to resolve an inconsistency in the majority view. However, I shall suggest
next that arbitrariness can be controlled by merging at the level of evidence rather than at the level
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Table 2. The epistemic states of A and B
Grants Believes Judges
A ¬l ¬r ¬r,¬c
Bh ∅ r,c
4 Merging evidence
When devising a method of aggregating judgements, one might have one of two goals in mind.
One natural goal is to try to ﬁnd a fair procedure—a procedure that treats all agents equally, where
all agents’ judgements contribute in the same way in determining the aggregate. Since the recent
literature on judgement aggregation has stemmed from work in social choice theory—e.g. work
on trying to devise fair voting systems—this goal has hitherto been paramount. Unfortunately, the
discursive dilemma and the impossibility results suggest that this goal may be unattainable.1
Another natural goal is to try to ﬁnd a judgement aggregation procedure that yields the right
judgements. Arguably, if this is the primary goal then it matters little whether different agents’
judgements play an equal role in determining the aggregate. Thus the impossibility results, whose
assumptions are motivated by fairness considerations, need not apply. This latter goal will be our
goal here.2
Consider the following judgement aggregation problem. A patient has received some treatment
for breast cancer and two consultants, A and B, need to make the following judgements. First, they
need to judge whether or not the patient’s cancer will recur, r, in order to inform the patient of her
prospects. Second, they need to judge whether or not chemotherapy is required, c (if recurrence is
unlikely then aggressive treatments such as chemotherapy, which have harsh side effects, may not
be justiﬁed). In this kind of example, when aggregating judgements it is far more important that the
collectivejudgementsbetherightjudgementsthanthattheybefairtotheindividualagents’opinions:
the patient’s health is more important than the egos of the consultants.
ConsultantAhasclinicalevidence:thetumourhasnotspreadtolymphnodes,¬l.Thisleadsherto
believe that the cancer will not recur, ¬r. She is not so sure about whether chemotherapy is required,
but on balance she judges that it is not. Thus A judges ¬r,¬c.
Consultant B has molecular evidence—the presence of certain hormone receptors in the patient.
Thisevidenceindicatesalessfavourableprognosis.B isnotconvincedenoughtosaythathebelieves
r and c, but since a judgement is required, he judges r,c.
Table 2 represents the epistemic states of the two consultants. The epistemological picture here
is that the agents have three grades of propositions: evidence, beliefs and judgements. The agent’s
evidence base includes all that she takes for granted in the context of the task in hand.As well as the
results of observation, it includes any theoretical and background assumptions that are not currently
open to question. The evidence base may equally be called her epistemic background or data. (As to
whether the agent is rational to take these propositions for granted will depend on the goals of her
1Some of those working on judgement aggregation argue that they are trying to model judgement aggregation scenarios
such as expert panels, rather than directly trying to ﬁnd a fair aggregation procedure. This may be so; however, the situations
being modelled are themselves typically constructed with fairness in mind. Thus fairness remains an indirect goal.
2Bovens and Rabinowicz [2]; Hartmann et al.[ 8] pursue this goal for instance, assessing standard judgement aggregation
proceduresfromthepointofviewofcorrectness.Thisisanormativegoal:thequestionishowoneshould aggregatejudgements
to yield the right judgements, not how people actually do aggregate judgements. Thus there is no need for an answer to this
question to be psychologically realistic. There is a need for any answer to be computationally feasible, but it will be beyond
the scope of this paper to address computational concerns in any detail.Aggregating Judgements by Merging Evidence 465
current enquiry as well as the provenance of the propositions themselves.) The agent’s beliefs are
not taken for granted, but are credible enough to be construed as accepted, and hopefully rationally
so. As can be seen from the above example, judgements often need to be made when there may be
little to decide one way or the other: they are speculated propositions—again, one hopes, rationally
so.Thus, the items of evidence are practically certain, beliefs have high credence, while a judgement
may be much more weakly believed.
Ifwearetoapplybeliefrevisionandmergingtotheproblemofjudgementaggregation,thequestion
arisesastowhatexactlywemerge.Itisnaturaltotrytomergethejudgementsthemselves—thisisthe
strategyofPigozzi[22],forinstance.Butthenwecomeupagainsttheproblemofarbitrariness.Inour
example, this amounts to merging {¬r,¬c} with {r,c}. This can be done by arbitrarily choosing one
agent’s judgements over the other, or by taking the disjunction of the judgements, (¬r∧¬c)∨(r∧c),
as the aggregate. This last strategy does not avoid arbitrariness: the aggregated judgements do not
contain judgements on the propositions we want, so to make judgements about recurrence and
chemotherapy on the basis of the disjunctive aggregate requires arbitrary choice.
Perhaps the theory of belief revision and merging should be applied at the level of belief—this is
ostensibly what the theory concerns. I think that this is a mistake, for two reasons. First, the theory
of belief revision and merging is more suited to revising and merging evidence than belief. This
can be seen as follows. Belief revision is related to nonmonotonic logic: there is a correspondence
between revision operators   and consistency-preserving rational consequence relations |∼ (i.e.
|∼ satisfying the Gabbay-Makinson conditions for nonmonotonic consequence together with the
rule θ  |= ¬τ ⇒θ |  ∼¬τ for tautology τ) via the equivalence θ |∼ ϕ⇔ either θ is inconsistent or else
ϕ∈T  θ. In turn, nonmonotonic logic is related to probability: there is a correspondence between
non-trivial rational consequence relations |∼ and ε-probability functions p (probability functions
whose range is [0,1] augmented with inﬁnitesimal numbers) via the equivalence θ |∼ ϕ⇔ either
p(θ)=0 or else p(¬ϕ|θ) is inﬁnitesimal or zero.3 Thus there is a correspondence between revision
operators   and the ε-probability functions p that only award probability zero to contradictions: T  θ
consists of those sentences whose probability conditional on θ is inﬁnitesimally close to 1. Similarly,
there is a correspondence between merging operators  ι (under a deductive closure condition) and
such ε-probability functions:  ι{T} consists of those sentences whose probability conditional on ι
is inﬁnitesimally close to 1. Now under a Bayesian account, ε-probability is construed as a measure
of degree of belief. Thus T  θ is the set of sentences that are believed to degree inﬁnitesimally
close to 1, given θ;  ι{T} is the set of sentences that are believed to degree inﬁnitesimally close
to 1, given ι. Under the Bayesian account, degrees of belief are understood as indicative of betting
intentions; an inﬁnitesimal difference between two degrees of belief has no consequence in terms
of betting; hence ‘inﬁnitesimally close to 1’corresponds to practical certainty. Thus  ι{T} is the set
of sentences that are practically certain given ι. But then  ι{T} cannot be interpreted as an agent’s
qualitative beliefs, since practical certainty is an absurdly high standard for qualitative belief. A
sentence might be deemed believed simpliciter if it is strongly believed—say to degree 0.8 or 0.9
depending on circumstances—but it is far too stringent to insist that one’s beliefs must be practically
certain. Rather, it is the agent’s evidence that is practically certain. Therefore belief revision and
merging should be used to revise and merge evidence rather than belief.4
3See Paris [20] for a nice introduction to these connections.
4The distinction between evidence and belief tends to be passed over in the literature; Pigozzi [22] and many of those
working in the area of belief revision and merging use ‘knowledge’and ‘belief’interchangeably. Note that Kyburg Jr. et al.
([14], Section 6) suggest some modiﬁcations to the belief revision framework if it is to used to handle propositions that are
rationally accepted, rather than known. The view of rational acceptance that they consider is that provided by the theory of
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There is a second reason why merging agents’beliefs is mistaken. In our example, such a merging
operation would yield ¬r as the merged belief set. Presumably, then, judging ¬r ought to be
reasonable given these merged beliefs. But in fact such a judgement may be very unreasonable:
it may be that the presence of both the patient’s symptoms together makes recurrence quite likely.
Merging beliefs will thus ignore any interactions between the pieces of evidence that give rise to the
beliefs.
These two considerations motivate merging the agents’ evidence instead of their beliefs or
judgements. On the one hand, this is the correct domain of application of the theory of belief revision
and merging. On the other, one must merge the reasons for the agents’beliefs and judgements, rather
thanthebeliefsorjudgementsthemselves,ifoneistoachievethegoalofmakingtherightjudgements.
The right judgement is that which, considering all available evidence, is most appropriate given the
uses to which the judgement will be put. Only by merging the evidence itself can one consider all
available evidence; merging beliefs or judgements directly will ignore interactions amongst items of
evidence.
Merging at the level of evidence has a further advantage: it reduces arbitrariness. We often have
to make judgements in the face of extensive uncertainty—there may be little to decide between a
proposition and its negation, yet we must make a call one way or the other. Different agents are
likely to make different calls, yielding mutually inconsistent judgements. If these judgements are
to be merged, this leads to arbitrariness on the part of the merging operator. Beliefs are of a higher
epistemologicalgradethanjudgements:tocountasabeliefinthequalitativesense,apropositionmust
bestronglybelievedinaquantitativesense.Fewerpropositionsarelikelytomakethisgradeandhence
there are likely to be fewer inconsistencies between different agents’beliefs than between different
agents’judgements. Thus merging beliefs involves less arbitrariness than merging judgements. But
evidence is of a higher grade yet: an item of evidence is taken for granted and so practically certain.
Of course, items of evidence may be false; hence inconsistencies may arise between different agents’
data bases. But such inconsistencies will be considerably rarer than those that arise between belief
bases,letalonejudgements.Therefore,mergingevidenceavoidsmuchofthearbitrarinessthatbesets
attempts to merge judgements directly.
I have argued thus far that a merging operator should operate on agents’evidence bases rather than
their beliefs or judgements. If merging is to be applied to judgement aggregation, we then require
some way of determining a set of judgements from a merged evidence base. These judgements can
be viewed as the aggregate. Is it this task to which we shall turn next.
5 From merged evidence to judgements
Judgement is essentially a decision problem. For each proposition in an agenda, one must decide
whether to endorse that proposition or its negation. One makes the right judgements to the extent
that the judgements are most appropriate considering the uses that will be made of them. Typically,
as in the case of our example, one would like one’s judgements to be true, but it is sufﬁcient that
they are determined in the right way from one’s epistemic background: a false judgement may be
the right judgement if it is most plausible on the basis of the limited evidence available; conversely
a true judgement may be the wrong judgement if it is unlikely given what is known.
Since judgement is a decision problem, decision theory can be applied to judgement formation.
Asimpledecision-theoreticaccountmightproceedlikethis.Letu(x|y)representtheutilityofjudging
x given that y is the case. For example,Table 3 gives a table of utilities for judging cancer recurrence:
the judgement will be used to inform the patient of her prospects, so judging the true outcome hasAggregating Judgements by Merging Evidence 467
Table 3. Autility matrix for judging
recurrence
Judgement
r ¬r
Case r 1 −1
¬r −31
Table 4. Autility matrix for judging
chemotherapy
Judgement
c ¬c
Case r 5 −10
¬r −41
positive utility while judging the false outcome has negative utility and is particularly bad when
falsely judging recurrence because it leads to needless anxiety. Then decide on the judgement that
maximisesexpectedutility,EU(x)=

yu(x|y)p(y)wherep(y)istheprobabilityofy.Inourexample,
judgerecurrenceifEU(r)>EU(¬r),i.e.ifp(r)>2/3.Judgementsmaydependonpropositionsother
than the judged proposition. Table 4 gives a utility matrix for judging chemotherapy: judging in
favour of chemotherapy is a good thing if the patient’s cancer would otherwise recur but quite bad if
it would not recur; judging against chemotherapy is very bad given recurrence but quite good given
non-recurrence. Decide in favour of chemotherapy if EU(c)>EU(¬c), i.e. if p(r)>1/4.
We see then that if we are to apply this decision-theoretic approach to judgement, we need to
determine probabilities, e.g. p(r).
Objective Bayesianism can be used to determine the required probabilities.According to objective
Bayesian epistemology, probabilities are to be interpreted as an agent’s degrees of belief, and it is
the agent’s evidence which determines the degrees of belief that she should adopt [27]. Evidence
determines degrees of belief in two ways. First, an agent’s degrees of belief should be calibrated
with her evidence: if she grants a, she should set p(a)=1; if her evidence base determines a suitable
frequency for a, she should set p(a) to that frequency. (e.g. if she knows just that the frequency of
recurrenceinpatientswithbreastcanceris0.4,thensheshouldsetp(r)=0.4).Second,herdegreesof
belief should otherwise be as equivocal as possible: if empirical calibration does not fully determine
p(a), e.g. p(a)∈[0.3,0.4], then she should set p(a) to the value that most equivocates between a and
¬a, p(a)=0.4 in this case. (She should equivocate because if she were to believe propositions to a
greater or lesser amount than warranted by evidence, she would open herself up to unjustiﬁed risks: a
middling value for p(r) might lead the agent to collect further evidence, while a more extreme value
might lead to unjustiﬁed chemotherapy or an unjustiﬁed failure to administer chemotherapy—see
[23, 26] on this point.)
Assumingforsimplicitythatanagent’slanguageisaﬁnitepropositionallanguageL={a1,...,an},
objective Bayesian epistemology can be explicated by the following principles:
Probability: The agent’s degrees of belief can be represented by a probability function p over L.
Calibration: If evidence determines that empirical probability (frequency) lies in some set P of
probability functions then p∈[P], where [P] is the smallest closed convex set of probability
functions containing P.468 Aggregating Judgements by Merging Evidence
Equivocation: p is the most equivocal probability function in [P], where the degree to which a
probabilityfunctionequivocatesismeasuredbyitsentropy−

ωp(ω)logp(ω)whereω ranges
over the atomic states ±a1∧···∧±an of L.5
It turns out that p is uniquely determined by the agent’s evidence.6
We have, now, all the tools we need for a normative account of judgement aggregation. First,
use a merging operator to merge the agents’ evidence bases. This merged evidence base can be
thought of as the evidence base of a hypothetical agent M. Objective Bayesianism can then be used
to determine the degrees of belief that M should adopt, given this merged evidence. Finally, decision
theory can be used to determine the judgements that M should make given these degrees of belief.
Thesejudgementscanbeviewedastheaggregateoftheindividualagents’judgements,althoughthey
are a function of the individual agents’evidence bases rather than of their judgement sets. (Note that
it is not assumed that the original agents determine their own judgements via objective Bayesianism
and decision theory. Indeed, the procedure outlined here does not depend on the original agents’own
judgement procedures at all.All that is assumed is that these agents have some evidence and that this
evidence can be made explicit in order for merging to take place.After merging, it is the hypothetical
agent who conforms to the norms of objective Bayesian epistemology and decision theory.)
Inourexampletheitemsofevidence¬landhareconsistent.Hence,bymergingpostulate 1,their
merger is {¬l,h}. To make it more interesting, we shall assume that the two consultants have some
commonevidencegleanedfromhospitaldata,namelythatthefrequencyofrecurrencegivennolymph
canceris0.2,andthatthefrequencyofrecurrencegiventhepresenceoftherelevanthormonereceptor
is 0.6. Thus, calibration yields the constraints p(r|¬l)=0.2,p(r|h)=0.6. We shall also suppose that
the consultants know that r is not a cause of l or h. (As explained inWilliamson [24], in the presence
ofsuchcausalknowledgeentropymustbemaximisedsequentially:ﬁrstmaximiseentropytoﬁndthe
probability distribution over l and h, then maximise entropy again to ﬁnd the probability distribution
over r, given the previously determined probabilities of l and h.) Then maximising entropy yields
p(r)=p(r|¬l∧h)=2/5. Now p(r)<2/3, so M should judge ¬r. Further, p(r)>1/4s oM should
judge c. The epistemic state of the merged agent is depicted in Table 5; rather than M having
qualitative beliefs she has a quantitative belief—she believes r to degree 0.4. Clearly, the aggregate
judgement set {¬r,c} could not be produced by merging the agents’ judgements, nor could it be
produced by merging their beliefs. To ﬁnd the right judgements we need to merge evidence.
6 Concluding remarks
If one is concerned with ﬁnding the right judgements, one should not apply belief merging directly
to agents’judgement sets. Instead, one should apply belief merging to the agents’evidence bases and
5It should be emphasized that Equivocation is entirely subsidiary to Calibration and that while Calibration is motivated
largely by evidential concerns, Equivocation is motivated by pragmatic considerations. It is not evidence that motivates the
choice of the most equivocal function in [P] since all the evidence is ‘used up’ in determining [P] in the ﬁrst place. All the
functions in [P] are compatible with the evidence, and the maximum entropy function is chosen because it is most cautious
on average with respect to risky decisions ([26], Section 8). It might be objected that an appeal to risk smuggles decision
theoretic considerations into probability, but in response it should be pointed out that (i) the whole notion of degree of belief
is intertwined with pragmatic concerns—the justiﬁcation of Probability typically appeals to betting considerations (the Dutch
book argument), and Calibration is only desirable inasmuch as one wants one’s bets to be successful, and (ii) these appeals to
pragmatic considerations are independent of any particular decision theory—whatever decision theory one advocates, one’s
degrees of belief ought to satisfy the above three principles.
6Note that p may vary as the agent’s language changes, and this fact has been cited as grounds for concern. In Williamson
[24, Chapter 12], I argue that this relativity to language is unobjectionable: an agent’s language expresses implicit evidence
about her domain, and an agent’s degrees of belief should change as her evidence base changes.Aggregating Judgements by Merging Evidence 469
Table 5. The epistemic states of A, B, and
the merged agent M
Grants Believes Judges
A ¬l ¬r ¬r,¬c
Bh ∅ r,c
Mh ,¬lr 0.4 ¬r,c
consider a single hypothetical agent with this merged evidence base. One can determine appropriate
degrees of belief for this hypothetical agent using objective Bayesian theory and then determine
appropriate judgements using decision theory. These judgements can be viewed as the aggregate of
the original agents’judgement sets.
This judgement aggregation framework appeals to an epistemology of evidence, rational degree
of belief and rational judgement, rather than the epistemology of evidence, qualitative belief
and judgement outlined in Section 4. It integrates logic (merging evidence), probability theory
(determining degrees of belief) and decision theory (determining judgements). While objective
Bayesianism maps evidence to degrees of belief and decision theory maps degrees of belief and
utilitiestojudgements,thelogicalstage—merging—isthusfarunderspeciﬁed:noparticularmerging
operator has been advocated for merging evidence. Clearly, a lot will depend on choice of merging
operator, and some remarks are in order. Merging operators are often motivated by majority voting
considerations: if two agents advocate a and only one agent advocates ¬a then a is normally taken
to be the result of the merger. This strategy is rather dubious when it comes to merging evidence,
since given that the agents disagree about a it seems unreasonable to take a for granted. On the other
hand,wedohavesomeinformationabouta,anditdoesseemreasonablethattheagentshouldconfer
higherdegreeofbeliefonathanon¬a.7 Onecanmodelthiskindofsituationasfollows.Letvariable
A take possible assignments a,¬a. For each agent i who has either a or ¬a in her evidence base,
construct a variable Ai with possible assignments ai (signifying that i grants a), and ¬ai (signifying
that i grants ¬a). Take A to be a cause of each Ai, as in Figure 1. Suppose we have some reliability
threshold τ ∈[1/2,1] such that for all i=1,...,k,p(ai|a)≥τ and p(¬ai|¬a)≥τ. Let a
εi
i signify the
assignmentthatAi actuallytakes(ai ifi grantsa,¬ai ifi grants¬a)andletmbethemajoritygranting
a, i.e. the number of agents granting a minus the number granting ¬a.Then we can ﬁnd the objective
Bayesian recommendation by maximising entropy:8
p(a|a
ε1
1 ···a
εk
k )=
τm
τm+(1−τ)m.
This function is portrayed in Figure 2. We see then that if we have a reliability threshold τ,w e
have what we need to deﬁne a merging operator. The characterization and properties of the ensuing
merging operator are questions for further research.
7Some merging operators in the literature are not based on majority voting considerations and in this example would not
include a in the merger. In particular, consistency-based merging operators look for maximal consistent subsets of the union
of the evidence bases—see, e.g. Delgrande and Schaub [5]. But these merging operators just ignore the evidence in favour of
a, which itself seems unreasonable.
8The maximum entropy function is represented by the Bayesian network with the graph of Figure 1 and conditional
distributions p(a)=1/2,p(ai|a)=τ,p(ai|¬a)=1−τ. Such a network is called an objective Bayesian net—see, e.g.
Williamson [25] for further discussion of the use of objective Bayesian nets to handle threshold probabilities.470 Aggregating Judgements by Merging Evidence
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Figure 1. A causes A1,...,Ak.
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Figure 2. The degree to which the merged agent should believe a.
It may seem that the judgement aggregation procedure advocated in this article suffers because
it ignores the expertise of the two consultants in our example: their judgements are aggregated by
disregarding their judgements and merging their evidence instead, so the agents play no role in the
process. But this latter conclusion does not follow. While this procedure does disregard the agents’
actual judgements, their expertise in forming those judgements need not be ignored since it can
be put to good use in the formulation of decision problem. Deciding what to judge on the basis
of merged evidence requires the calculation of utilities and here the consultants’ expertise will be
crucial.Moreover,theaggregationprocedurerequiresthattheagents’evidencebasesbemerged,and
this evidence will go beyond a simple list of the patients’symptoms—it will encapsulate a large part
of their expertise. Thus, the agents’ expertise feeds in to the ﬁrst and last steps of the aggregation
procedure.
There is an interesting question as to how utilities should be determined for the decision-
theoreticcomponentofthejudgementaggregationprocedure.Perhapsthesimplestapproachinvolves
aggregating the utilities of the individual agents. Since utilities are numbers rather than propositions,
one can simply average the utilities of the respective agents. However, there are several potentialAggregating Judgements by Merging Evidence 471
problems with this approach. First, the individual agents may have no utilities—they need not have
used formal decision theory to come up with their judgements. Second, there may be no guarantee
that any requirements of the decision theory (e.g. transitivity of preferences) remain satisﬁed by
the aggregated utilities [9, 19]. Third, just as some agents may be better than others at latching
onto the right judgements, some may be better than others at determining appropriate utilities, in
which case treating the agents symmetrically may not yield the right utilities. Fourth, the required
utilities depend to a certain extent on the uses of the aggregated judgements (e.g. palliative versus
curative care of the patient in the cancer example), and these uses may vary considerably from the
intentionsoftheoriginalagents.Theseconsiderationsmotivateanalternativestrategyfordetermining
utilities that is analogous to the objective Bayesian procedure for determining degrees of belief.
The available evidence, which may include evidence of the original agents’utilities and intentions,
imposes constraints on an appropriate utility function for the decision-theoretic component of the
aggregation problem (this is the analogue of the Calibration principle of Section 5). The decision
theory will also impose certain constraints (the Probability principle). One may then choose a utility
function, from all those that satisfy the constraints, that is as equivocal as possible (Equivocation).
Exactly how these principles are to be ﬂeshed out remains a question for future research.
The normative goal sets the approach of this article apart from previous work in judgement
aggregation,whichtendstobemotivatedbyconsiderationsoffairness.Inparticular,theimpossibility
results discussed in Section 2 do not get off the ground because the assumptions they make need not
hold. Universal Domain fails because the individual judgement sets are not even in the domain of
the aggregation function. (One can salvage Universal Domain by construing ‘judgements’liberally
to include evidence as well as judgements in the literal sense, but there seems little to be gained by
this since the whole approach outlined here is predicated upon a distinction between evidence and
judgement.)As to whether Collective Rationality holds will depend on the particular decision theory
employed; consistency may seem desirable but it is not too hard to envisage very complex agendas
where some more limited paraconsistency is all that is required. Independence fails because the
aggregate judgements depend on the agents’evidence bases rather than their judgements. Unanimity
fails because each agent’s evidence may motivate a judgement a while the collective evidence
indicates ¬a (as happens with the lottery paradox, for instance).9
Returning to the discursive dilemma of Table 1, we see that the problem is under-speciﬁed. There
is no obvious solution to the paradox because there is no information about the evidence on which
the judgements are based. Only by considering the total evidence available can we determine the
right judgements.
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